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The Impact of State and Trait Anxiety on Performance in a Source Monitoring Task 
 




This study examined the impact of state anxiety (current emotional state) and trait anxiety 
(predisposition) on a source monitoring task.  The unique question asked in this study was 
whether highly anxious people who are distressed following a stressful to-be-remembered event 
are better at source monitoring. Seventy-two undergraduates completed a measure of anxiety and 
then either received an anxious mood (n = 36) or mood stabilizing (n = 36) induction before 
viewing to-be-source monitored material.  Participants then completed a source identification 
task in which they were asked to identify the source of the to-be-source monitored information. 
Participants high in state anxiety were more accurate on the source identification task. The main 
effect of trait anxiety and the state-trait anxiety interaction were nonsignificant. Neither state nor 
trait anxiety impacted accuracy on misleading information items presented within the source 
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The Impact of State and Trait Anxiety on Performance in a Source Monitoring Task 
Anxiety and Memory 
People are often victims or witnesses to criminal activity.  Understanding the factors that 
impact accurate reports of crime-related events is therefore important.  A large body of research 
exists on memory for emotional events (see Reisburg & Heuer, 2007, for a review).  However, 
little research has examined how people with anxiety remember stressful events.  In the real 
world, people are likely to become anxious when witnessing a crime. Therefore, it is important to 
determine whether people high and low in anxiety would remember the crime similarly. This 
research question motivated the proposed study.  In the current study, the anxious mood 
induction will occur prior to the to-be-remembered event.  This is considered to be advantageous 
over having a stressful event as the to-be-remembered event because memory for portions of the 
to-be-remembered event before and after people recognize the stressful nature of the event may 
be impacted differently.   
Researchers have theorized that anxiety will impact memory (See Becker, Roth, Andrich, 
& Margraf, 1999; Wenzel & Holt, 2002).  More specifically, people with anxiety are theorized to 
attend to threatening information due to the existence of hypothesized danger-related schemata, 
which guide their attentional processes when the schemata are activated (Beck & Emery, 1979).  
Therefore, people with anxiety are expected to show better memory for threatening information 
or information that activates their anxiety than people without anxiety (See McCabe, 1999).  
That is, anxious individuals are expected to show a memory bias (i.e., superior memory) for 
anxiety-related information compared to nonanxious individuals. Attention to threat-related 
information is more likely to occur during physiological arousal (See Coles, Turk, & Heimberg, 
2007).   
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Other researchers theorize relations between anxiety and cognitive processes which 
including memory.  According to Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency theory, 
processing efficiency is deficient in people with high anxiety due to their resources being utilized 
towards worry rather than towards the task at hand.  Highly anxious people have been shown to 
increase their effort towards a task in order to prevent problems they foresee probably 
happening.  Along with this, worry increases motivation, which leads to greater performance 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).   
Empirical studies support the theory that people with anxiety disorders display memory 
biases for threatening information.  For example, in a study examining memory biases in panic 
disordered individuals, Becker, Roth, Andrich, and Margraf (1999) found that, compared to the 
control participants, the panic disordered participants displayed a memory bias for panic 
disorder-relevant words.  That is, panic disordered participants remembered more words 
associated with bodily symptoms (i.e., palpitations, constriction) than did control participants; 
however, both groups remembered neutral and positive words equally, ruling out a general bias 
toward emotional words.  
 Different types of anxiety disorders, including social anxiety disorder, have been studied 
in relation to memory biases.  Individuals with social anxiety have also been shown to exhibit 
memory biases for negative information about oneself, possibly due to their fear of evaluation 
from others.  Selectively remembering negative information about oneself may be connected to 
negative self-evaluations and a lack of self-reinforcement for social interactions, which could 
maintain a person’s anxiety about social situations (O’Banion & Arkowitz, 1977).  In this study, 
researchers asked women who were high in social anxiety and women who were low in social 
anxiety to interact individually with a confederate.  They then received positive or negative 
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feedback in the form of descriptions about how the confederate felt about them.   O’Banion and 
Arkowitz (1977) hypothesized that women who were given positive descriptions from the 
confederate would recall more positive information about themselves than the women who were 
given negative descriptions.  The results showed that women who were rated high in social 
anxiety remembered negative descriptions of themselves better than did women who were rated 
low in social anxiety.  The two groups did not differ on their memory of positive self-
descriptions, demonstrating that social anxiety may be mediated and maintained by this selective 
memory for negative information about oneself (O’Banion & Arkowitz, 1977). 
In a second study that examined memory biases in people with social anxiety, Wenzel 
and Holt (2002) provided socially anxious individuals and non-anxious control individuals with 
written stimuli with evaluative threat-related words and neutral words.  Their results, in support 
of their hypotheses, showed that the socially anxious participants remembered more of the 
evaluative threat material than the neutral material and recalled more threat-related words than 
the non-anxious control participants (Wenzel & Holt, 2002). 
People with Generalized Anxiety Disorder also are expected to exhibit memory biases.  
Coles and colleagues (2007) conducted the first study on memory biases in persons with 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder using personally-relevant threatening words.  Participants were 
diagnosed with Generalized Anxiety Disorder based on the Anxiety Disorders Interview 
Schedule for DSM-IV: Lifetime Version.  Control participants did not meet criteria for any 
current or past Axis I disorders.  Participants were given a list of 80 words: 40 Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder-related threat words, 20 neutral words, and 20 GAD-related positive words.  
They rated each word on a Likert-scale ranging from -3 = “extremely negative for me” to +3 = 
“extremely positive for me.”   The words to be remembered were chosen for each participant 
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based on his/her ratings to ensure relevance for each participant.  The participants completed an 
incidental learning task, which means that the participants were not aware that they would be 
tested on their memory for the material at a later point.  The task required participants to view 
words they previously rated as threatening, neutral, and positive; to imagine themselves in a 
situation involving each word; and then to rate how easy or difficult it was to imagine the scene.  
The participants then completed a 5-minute non-verbal filler task, which had them complete 
patterns presented to them visually.  Next, the participants completed a stem-completion task to 
measure implicit memory.  The task required participants to look at the first three letters of a 
word and complete the word with the first letters that came to mind.  Finally, the participants 
completed a free recall task that required them to write down as many words as they could 
remember from the incidental learning task.  The researchers found that participants with 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder remembered more threatening words, demonstrating a memory 
bias, and rated the threatening words as being more negative than did the nonanxious controls 
(Coles et al., 2007).   
Evidence of a memory bias in anxious individuals may depend on the extent to which a 
person is high or low in trait anxiety.  Specifically, McCabe (1999) wanted to determine if 
selective memory for threat, as is shown in panic-disordered patients, only occurs after an 
unexpected panic attack or if it is related to the anxiety sensitivity level of the individual and 
whether it is more pronounced when arousal is high.  She examined memory biases in people 
with high trait anxiety and in people with low-trait anxiety, as measured by the Anxiety 
Sensitivity Index, specifically focusing on selective memory for anxiety-related words (e.g., 
palpitation, fearful) and general threat words (e.g., explosion, poison).  The design of this study 
included positive words (e.g., optimistic, pleasant) to control for a bias in emotional words.  
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Neutral words (e.g., oven, bench) were also included to serve as a baseline measure of memory.  
Participants were first randomly assigned to the high-arousal and low-arousal conditions.  They 
were then shown words and asked to rate the extent to which they liked or disliked the word on a 
7-point Likert scale, ranging from -3 (strongly dislike) to +3 (strongly like).  Six neutral words 
were included to control for primacy and recency effects and the remainder of the words 
included 24 positive words, 24 neutral words, 24 anxiety-related, and 24 general threat words.   
The participants in the high-arousal condition then participated in a hyperventilation task and the 
participants in the low-arousal condition participated in a relaxation task.  Participants in both 
groups then completed measures evaluating their anxiety levels.  Following this, participants 
completed a word stem completion task to measure implicit memory.  Next, they completed a 
cued recall test to measure explicit memory.  Finally, participants completed measures, including 
the ASI (McCabe, 1999). 
   McCabe (1999) used a 2 (Group: High Anxiety, Low Anxiety) X 2 (Arousal: High 
Arousal, Low Arousal) ANOVA. The results indicate a memory bias in people with high trait 
anxiety for general threat words, but not for anxiety-related words.  People with high trait 
anxiety also evaluated the words to be significantly more negative than did people with low trait 
anxiety.  People with low trait anxiety remembered more positive words, suggesting that they 
attend to positive information more than people with high trait anxiety.  Greater attention to 
positive stimuli is thought to be a protective factor preventing people from developing anxiety.  
Although analyses revealed that the arousal manipulation was successful, arousal level did not 
impact memory performance.  There was no effect of state anxiety on memory (McCabe, 1999). 
Effects of Anxiety on Memory for Nonthreatening Stimulus Material 
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 Additional studies have examined the impact of anxiety on memory for nonthreatening 
stimulus materials.   Kaye, Kirschner, and Mandler (1953) examined the effect of test anxiety in 
adults, as measured by an anxiety questionnaire designed to specifically measure test anxiety 
(See Sarason & Mandler, 1952), on memory for number series, mixed letter and number series, 
and short word series in a group testing situation.  Participants were split into high- and low-
anxiety groups and told that they were going to take the working memory portion of the IQ test 
and receive their scores shortly afterward.  The low-anxiety participants scored higher on the test 
than did the high-anxiety participants. 
State Anxiety Induction 
Anxiety induction has been utilized in studies examining an individual’s accuracy on an 
eyewitness task to observe the differential effects of anxiety levels on eyewitness memory.  
Dobson and Markham (1992) induced anxiety in 120 undergraduate psychology students using 
evaluative threat to increase state anxiety at encoding, at retrieval, at both encoding and retrieval, 
or at neither point.  They hypothesized that participants who were in a high state of anxiety at 
both encoding and retrieval would be less accurate on an eyewitness task than would low-
anxious participants.  They also hypothesized that inducing evaluative threat during their state 
anxiety induction during retrieval would decrease the high-anxious participants’ accuracy, but 
would not negatively impact low-anxious participants’ accuracy.  Participants were told they 
were going to view some slides that they would later be asked about.   State anxiety was induced 
via telling the participants in two high anxiety groups and two low anxiety groups that their 
performance on the task was directly related to intelligence; highly correlated with their 
academic success; and their performance would be compared to their peers’ performances.  First, 
participants viewed slides showing an incident of purse-grabbing and the events that occurred 
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before and after that incident.  Second, participants completed a questionnaire for 20 minutes 
regarding their opinions about crime and punishment.  The group that was assigned to experience 
the state anxiety induction only at encoding was then told that they were not going to be being 
evaluated during the following recognition task.  Next, participants either received anxiety-
inducing instructions if they were in the experimental groups assigned to receive the state anxiety 
induction at retrieval or at both encoding and retrieval, or participants received control 
instructions.  Finally, the participants answered 30 multiple-choice questions about the slides 
they viewed (Dobson & Markham, 1992). 
Dobson and Markham’s (1992) results, in support of their hypothesis, showed that low-
anxious participants were more accurate on the eyewitness task than were the high-anxious 
participants when state anxiety was induced at both encoding and retrieval.  The performance of 
the high-anxious participants and low-anxious participants did not differ significantly in the 
remaining three conditions.  Low-anxious participants were more accurate on the eyewitness task 
when they experienced the state anxiety induction at encoding and retrieval than they did in the 
control condition.  High-anxious participants did not differ significantly on their memory 
accuracy in the state anxiety induction condition from in the control condition.  Furthermore, 
their findings support the idea that the interaction of individual and situational variables plays an 
important role on eyewitness accuracy (Dobson & Markham, 1992). 
In sum, the previously described studies show that higher levels of anxiety are associated 
with lower levels of recall.  
 
Anxiety and Suggestibility 
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Research shows that memory and suggestibility are related.  The memory trace strength 
theory of suggestibility states that stronger memories are more resistant to suggestibility.  A 
memory will gain strength with greater exposure to an event or item (Pezdek & Roe, 1995).   
Ridley and Clifford (2004) examined the impact of state anxiety on suggestibility.  They, 
like Dobson and Markham (1992), used evaluative threat to induce state anxiety, specifically at 
either encoding or retrieval of misleading post-event information, at both encoding and retrieval, 
or at neither point.   First, the participants completed a visual analogue mood scale (VAMS) in 
order to measure state anxiety.  Second, they viewed a 3-minute video depicting a kidnapping 
scenario.  Third, participants completed a second VAMS to measure their state anxiety. Fourth, 
they were interviewed individually with either misleading content or with correctly leading 
content, without the knowledge that misleading post-event information might be included.  
Participants who were assigned to experience the state anxiety induction during encoding and 
during both encoding and retrieval were videotaped and watched themselves on a monitor.  They 
were told that a mock-jury would evaluate their performance.  After this, all participants 
completed another VAMS to evaluate state anxiety induction or to gather control data.  
Participants then completed irrelevant questionnaires to ensure that 15 minutes passed.  At this 
point, participants who were assigned to experience the state anxiety induction at retrieval went 
through the same procedure as the other groups previously experienced.  The participants 
assigned to experience the state anxiety induction at both encoding and retrieval went through 
the same procedure again at this point.  Finally, all participants then answered a standard set of 
questions and then completed another VAMS (Ridley & Clifford, 2004). 
  Ridley and Clifford (2004) found that the state anxiety induction was successful and, 
therefore, increased levels of anxiety for all participants.  An ANOVA was conducted examining 
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the anxiety groups separately and combined, but no significant main or interactions effects were 
found for memory accuracy.  A significant main effect of anxiety on suggestibility in the misled 
condition was found.  A t-test revealed that the participants in the misinformed condition who 
did not experience the state anxiety induction were significantly more suggestible than the other 
groups. Implementing a state anxiety induction during encoding, retrieval, or both encoding and 
retrieval significantly reduces suggestibility for people who have been misled.  This suggests that 
state anxiety inductions have an impact on memory accuracy at encoding and/or retrieval when 
misleading post-event information is presented (Ridley & Clifford, 2004).   
Several studies have examined the question of whether anxiety impacts suggestibility in 
children.  Ridley, Clifford, and Keogh (2002) hypothesized that children will be suggestible to 
misleading information.  Supported by Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency theory, 
they also predicted that high- and low-state-anxious children would not differ significantly on 
correctly leading information, but that they would differ in suggestibility levels on misleading 
information.  The study design was a 2 (high or low state anxiety) X 2 (misleading or correctly 
leading) factorial.  They also ran correlations among memory accuracy, suggestibility, state 
anxiety, and depression.  Eighty-three children were tested in two separate classes at two 
separate schools.  The classes were randomly assigned to one of the experimental groups 
manipulating misleading or correctly leading information.  Children whose percentile rank of the 
sample for state anxiety was equal to or exceeding 66 were included in the high anxiety group 
and children whose percentile rank was equal to or less than 33 were in the low anxiety group.  
First, all of the children viewed a 3-minute, 45-second video of a car accident.  Second, they 
answered questions about the video they viewed, which included misleading information for the 
misleading group or correctly leading information for the control group.  They ensured that 10 
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minutes passed between the second and third steps of the study during which time the children 
completed Spielberger’s State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children.  Finally, the children 
answered questions that were meant to examine the effects of misleading information on their 
memories (Ridley et al., 2002).  
Ridley et al. (2002) found that state anxiety did not significantly affect the accuracy of 
the participants’ memory for correctly leading questions, but that state anxiety led to more 
accurate responses to misleading questions in the children.  That is, children high in state anxiety 
were less suggestible. 
Almerigogna, Ost, Bull, and Akehurst (2007) examined whether the combination of state 
and trait anxiety, as measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAI-C), 
influences children’s suggestibility to misleading information when the misleading information 
is presented during a memory interview in the form of misleading questions.   First, children 
completed the STAI-C.  Second, the children watched a movie clip from the children’s film 
‘Madeline’ in groups of 14-23 people.  Next, the children were interviewed individually and 
were asked seven non-leading control questions and seven misleading questions about the film 
clip they viewed. The experimenters manipulated the interview style, hoping to impact state 
anxiety, by having children interviewed by either a supportive or a non-supportive interviewer.  
Immediately after the memory interview, children again completed the STAI-C.  The non-
supportive interviewer condition was utilized to induce state anxiety in those children.  A 2 
(Interviewing Style: supportive or non-supportive) X 2 (Measures: memory accuracy and 
suggestibility) MANOVA was conducted.  An effect was found for interviewing style and 
suggestibility scores, with children interviewed in the non-supportive condition providing 
significantly more inaccurate answers to misleading questions.  There was no effect of 
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interviewing style on memory accuracy scores.  Next, effects of post-experimental anxiety on 
responses to correctly leading and misleading questions were examined.  A 4 (Anxiety: high and 
low state anxiety and high and low trait anxiety) X 2 (Measures: accuracy, suggestibility) 
MANOVA was conducted.  Children high in both state and trait anxiety gave more inaccurate 
answers to misleading questions than did children low in both state and trait anxiety.  High-trait 
and high post-interview state anxiety did not significantly affect correct responses to correctly 
leading questions.  In sum, the results of this study show that state anxiety decreases accurate 
responses to misleading questions.  Trait anxiety negatively impacts responses to misleading 
questions.  The combination of high state anxiety and high trait anxiety yields similar findings.  
With respect to misleading questions, state anxiety, trait anxiety, and the combination of state 
anxiety and trait anxiety do not impact the accuracy of responses to correctly leading questions 
(Almerigogna et al., 2007).   
Much of the research on anxiety and suggestibility has utilized the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scale (Merckelbach et al., 1998).  The scale is purported to examine an 
individual’s suggestibility.  Suggestibility is defined in two ways.  First, it is defined as 
susceptibility to being influenced by leading questions, known as “Yield.”  Second, 
suggestibility is defined as susceptibility to changing an answer under pressure, known as “Shift” 
(Merckelbach, Muris, Wessel, & van Koppen, 1998).  The GSS uses the following procedure: 
First, a narrative is read aloud to the participant.  Second, the participant verbally recounts as 
much as he or she can remember about the passage.   Third, the experimenter then asks the 
participant a standard set of questions that include misleading questions.  Finally, the interviewer 
provides negative feedback by convincingly telling the participant that he or she inaccurately 
answered several of the questions and has the participant attempt to answer the entire set of 
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questions for a final time.  The examiner records any changes in the participants’ answers.  
Changes in answers are referred to as “Shifts” (Merckelbach et al., 1998).  The literature shows 
that not every person shifts their answers due to a wide variety of individual differences. 
In one such study, Gudjonsson (1988) examined the effects of state anxiety on 
suggestibility.  First, participants listened to the narrative for the GSS.  Second, they completed 
the free recall portion of the GSS followed by the Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory (SAI) and 
several other questionnaire measures not pertinent to this proposed thesis project.  Third, they 
provided recall for the narrative after the delay during which they were completing the scales.  
Next, participants completed the SAI again in reference to their emotions during the time they 
were participating in the GSS interrogation.  Finally, they reported any coping skills they had 
utilized during the interrogation (Gudjonsson, 1988).  Gudjonsson (1988) found that state anxiety 
is more closely related to suggestibility than is trait anxiety.  This may be due to the fact that 
state anxiety, not trait anxiety, is influenced by the immediate context (e.g., interrogative 
process).  Specifically, Yield 2 (after negative feedback) and Shift scores on the GSS correlate 
more strongly with anxiety than do initial scores on the misleading questions.  This study found a 
moderately high significant correlation between state anxiety and suggestibility, particularly 
Yield 2 scores, increasing as state anxiety increased (r = 0.48).  In regard to Shift scores, this 
correlation was strongest after the individuals with anxiety were given negative feedback (r = 
0.69).  In sum, after receiving negative feedback, participants with anxiety are more likely to 
respond to misleading questions incorrectly and to change their answers to the questions 
(Gudjonsson, 1988).     In other words, they are more suggestible. 
To observe the relationship between state and trait anxiety and suggestibility, Wolfradt 
and Meyer (1998) conducted a study using the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale, in which 
13 
 
participants with an anxiety disorder were compared to a nonanxious control group. First, the 
participants completed the GSS-2 to measure suggestibility.  After the immediate recall of the 
narrative passage, participants completed the State Trait Anxiety Inventory. The delayed recall 
phase of the GSS-2 was not examined due to the investigators’ concern of the clinical population 
overexerting themselves.   The anxiety disordered participants, who endorsed high levels of state 
anxiety (𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 = 54.36, SD = 11.97 vs. 𝑀𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = 26.78, SD = 2.50) and trait anxiety 
(𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 = 57.84, SD = 8.91 vs. 𝑀𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = 27.38, SD = 3.30), were more suggestible on the 
GSS-2 factors of suggestibility Yield, Shift, and total suggestibility than were the control 
participants (Wolfradt & Meyer, 1998).   
In sum, across studies, anxious individuals in a high state of anxiety were more 
suggestible than were the nonanxious controls. 
Anxiety and Source Monitoring 
According to Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993), source monitoring involves 
people making decisions about where they learned specific information, beliefs, and memories as 
they are attempting to recall them.  The amount of information recalled and the degree to which a 
person feels confident in their recollections varies greatly from person to person and even within 
a person (i.e., remembering someone’s face, but not how you know them, or remembering that 
you were given a piece of information, but cannot recall who gave it to you).  The source 
monitoring hypothesis states that source monitoring errors occur when a misled person is asked 
to recall the source of their information and they mistakenly recall the details of the misleading 
information as the details of their experienced event.  When a person bases his/her judgment 
about the source of their information on the fact that the information presented looks familiar, 
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rather than basing his/her judgment on the cues presented about the specific details of the 
original event, that person is likely to make source monitoring errors (Johnson et al., 1993). 
Johnson et al. (1993) report that an emotional event (i.e., an event that elevates a person’s 
state anxiety level) can disturb the encoding process, making it more difficult or impossible for a 
person to later recall certain specific details of the original event.  Along with this, they also state 
that a person who is highly anxious at the time of recall may have more difficulty recalling the 
information from the original event, as this can disrupt their source monitoring.  Therefore, 
individuals are more likely to recall be more accurate in source monitoring if they are not 
anxious at the time of recall.   
Also concerned with source identification, Ridley and Clifford (2006) conducted a 
correlational study where they hypothesized that tasks that require an individual to recall the 
source of their memory (source attributions) would increase levels of worry in people with high 
trait anxiety, leading to increased effort to respond accurately, which would result in fewer 
source misattribution errors.  According to Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency 
theory, highly anxious people utilize increased effort to accurately complete a task, but it 
increases the length of time it takes them to complete the task.  Fifty-four undergraduate students 
first viewed a 5-minute video showing a burglary and car chase.  Second, they completed 
questionnaires containing misleading information.  Third, the students completed the state and 
trait anxiety questionnaires.  Next, they completed an irrelevant writing task to ensure that 15 
minutes elapsed between the to-be-source monitored information and the source identification 
task.  Finally, participants completed a source monitoring task for which they were instructed 
verbally and in writing that there were a few statements in the source identification task that were 
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solely from the questions and that they should declare where they recalled learning of the items 
presented (Ridley & Clifford, 2006).   
Ridley and Clifford (2006) found that participants high in state anxiety made fewer 
source monitoring errors than participants lower in state anxiety. A multiple regression analysis 
was conducted that removed items for which people could not remember the source. The results 
of the analysis increased the amount of variance originally accounted for when the items for 
which people could not remember the source were included and increased the strength of the 
original correlation found between state anxiety and source misattribution errors.   When these 
forgotten items were excluded, an even stronger positive relationship emerged between state 
anxiety and source misattribution errors.  The relationship between trait anxiety and source 
misattribution errors was nonsignificant and the interaction between state and trait anxiety was 
nonsignificant (Ridley & Clifford, 2006).  
The literature varies on the relationship between source monitoring and anxiety.  Studies 
have found different results on whether high anxiety increases or decreases source monitoring 
errors.  This fact requires further research to be conducted in this area. 
The Current Study 
      The current study examined whether people who are anxious versus nonanxious performed 
differently on an eyewitness task when in a state of high versus low anxiety.  Only one previous 
study (Ridley & Clifford, 2006) has examined whether state and trait anxiety impact eyewitness 
performance in adults, but the study asks a different research question than the current study by 
nature of the fact that the researchers measured state anxiety after the to-be-remembered event.  
The current study asked the question whether highly anxious people who are distressed 
following a stressful to-be-remembered event are better at source monitoring.   In addition, in the 
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previous study, the researchers did not manipulate state anxiety.  As a result, the previous study 
is confounded by the typical high correlation between state and trait anxiety.  Further, the 
previous study measured anxiety using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. The current study 
examined anxiety utilizing the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire, as it is a measure of 
pure anxiety and has the ability to differentiate anxiety from depression (see Reidy & Keogh, 
1997; Keogh & Reidy, 2000).   
     In the current study, 4 groups (high trait, high state; high trait, low state; low trait, high state; 
low trait, low state) were formed to represent various combinations of state and trait anxiety.  
This combination of groups enabled the researchers to answer the key question about whether 
anxiety impacts eyewitness performance when participants are in a high anxious state.  
Participants’ anxiety levels were measured using the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire.  Participants with high and low anxiety then experienced a high or low (i.e., mood 
maintenance) state anxiety manipulation.  High state anxiety was induced via an anxious mood 
induction prior to presenting the to-be-remembered stimulus materials.  Low state anxiety was 
maintained via a mood stabilizing induction.  As in the Ridley and Clifford (2006) study, 
participants were presented with to-be-source monitored information via two methods: (1) 
viewing a forensically relevant video and (2) responding to questions designed for the purpose of 
presenting information to participants.  Next, participants were given a positive mood induction 
and additional activities to ensure that the effects of the anxious mood induction no longer 
impacted participants when they next participated in a source monitoring task (see also Ridley & 
Clifford, 2006 for this task).   
     The following hypotheses and research questions were addressed by the current study.   
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H1: There will be a main effect of trait anxiety, but the direction of the effect will not be 
hypothesized. 
H2: There will be a main effect of state anxiety.  Based on Ridley and Clifford (2006), people 
high in state anxiety will make fewer errors on the source monitoring task. 
RQ1:  Will there be an interaction between trait and state anxiety? 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 98 West Virginia University undergraduate students.  Of the original 98 
participants, data from 14participants was excluded due to missing data and/or scores of 4 or 
higher on the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire: Infrequency validity items.  An 
additional 12 participants’ data were excluded from the analyses because the anxious mood 
induction was not effective in increasing their anxiety ratings by at least 1 point on the Emotional 
Experiences Questionnaire. Therefore, 72 participants were included in the analyses. Half of the 
sample (n = 36) was in the anxious mood induction condition, while the other half was in the 
mood stabilizing condition. The number of participants in each group was: high state anxiety, 
high trait anxiety (n = 5); high state anxiety, low trait anxiety (n = 31); low state anxiety, high 
trait anxiety (n = 13); and low state anxiety, low trait anxiety (n = 23).The majority of 
participants were female (79.2%). Ages of participants ranged from 18 to 25 years (M = 20.07, 
SD= 1.75).The majority of participants self-identified as non-Hispanic/Caucasian (88.9%), 2.8% 
as black/African American, 2.8% as biracial, 2.8% as other, 1.4% as Asian, and 1.4% as 
Hispanic/Latino. Broken down by year of college, 26.4% were freshmen, 33.3% were 
sophomores, 25% were juniors, and 15.3% were seniors.  Participants were tested in groups of 
fewer than 8 individuals. If a single participant arrived at the session (n = 20), the participant was 
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run individually. Steps were taken to ensure participant privacy during the procedure, including 
seating participants several seats away from other participants.  Participants were recruited via 
West Virginia University’s Research Participation System (SONA), fliers, and in-class 
announcements. 
Measures 
 Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (Clark & Watson, 1991).The Mood and 
Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire is a 90-item self-report questionnaire.  The current study 
included 89 of the 90 questions.  The question referring to suicidal ideation and behavior was 
omitted, due to the fact that research has shown that this question loads on the depression scale, 
rather than the anxiety scale.   
     The Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire consists of three major scales: General 
Distress, anxiety-specific (Anxious Arousal), and depression-specific (Anhedonic Depression).  
The three-factor structure is supported by several investigations of the factor structure (Watson et 
al., 1995a; Watson et al., 1995b; Reidy & Keogh, 1997; Keogh & Reidy, 2000). The General 
Distress scale is comprised of three subscales: depressive symptoms, anxious symptoms, and 
mixed anxiety-depressive symptoms.  Each scale has strong internal consistency, ranging from 
0.78 to 0.92 (Buckby, Yung, Cosgrave, & Killackey, 2007).  Watson et al. (1995a) examined the 
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire and found that the measures of anxiety and 
depression exhibited high convergent validity, with anxious arousal correlating r = .72 on 
average with general distress: anxiety and with anhedonic depression correlating r = .70 on 
average with general distress: depression.  They also found that the anxious arousal and 
anhedonic depression scales were strong markers of the constructs they purport to measure, with 
general distress: anxiety and general distress: depression sharing 48% of their variance on 
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average and with anxious arousal and anhedonic depression sharing only 12% of their variance 
on average.  
Reidy and Keogh (1997) also examined the discriminant and convergent validity of the 
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire and found that the anxious arousal and anhedonic 
depression scales were successfully able to discriminate between anxiety and depression and 
exhibited high convergent validity.  Anxious arousal correlated strongly (r = .75) with general 
distress: anxiety correlated.  Anhedonic depression correlated strongly (r = .73) with general 
distress: depression.  Anxious arousal was correlated moderately (r = .45) with anhedonic 
depression showing discriminant validity between anxiety and depression.  The scales of the 
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire appear to be able to discriminate nonclinical anxiety 
and depression better than scales of other measures (Keogh & Reidy, 2000), such as the widely 
used State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.   
The Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire was used to identify participants who 
were assigned to one of four conditions: high trait anxiety, high state anxiety; high trait anxiety, 
low state anxiety; low trait anxiety, high state anxiety; or low trait anxiety, low state anxiety.    
Participants who scored 27 or above on the General distress: anxious arousal scale (n = 16) or 25 
or above on the General Distress: Anxiety sensitivity scale (n = 2) were assigned to the high trait 
anxiety conditions.  The mean score on General Distress: Anxious Arousal scale for high trait 
anxiety participants was M = 34.72, SD = 7.74, range 27-52 and was M = 22.04, SD= 3.86, range 
= 20-25 for low trait anxiety participants.  The mean score on the General Distress: Anxiety 
Sensitivity Scale for high trait anxiety participants was M = 27.00, SD = 4.31, range = 20-34 and 
was M = 17.65, SD = 3.19, range 11-25 for low trait anxiety participants. This cut is based on 
means and standard deviations used in previous investigations.  Further evidence for utilizing the 
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selected Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire cut-off scores is found in the raw data from 
Wu and Watson (2005).  This data set contains Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire 
general distress: anxiety scores for an outpatient sample diagnosed with anxiety disorders (i.e., 
obsessive compulsive disorder).   
 Demographic questionnaire. This questionnaire included questions regarding 
participants’ sex, ethnicity, year in college and family income.  The questionnaire also included 
questions about whether participants had been diagnosed with learning disabilities, Attention 
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and are currently in treatment or have had past treatment 
for an anxiety disorder.  Participants who had been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder and/or 
had previous or current treatment for anxiety were assigned to the low state anxiety condition.    
Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire: Infrequency validity items 
(Zuckerman, 2002).    There are 10 infrequency validity items on the Zuckerman-Kuhlman 
Personality Questionnaire.  Inclusion of these items allowed the researchers to identify those 
participants who were attempting to present in a socially desirable manner and/or those who 
were possibly answering the items haphazardly.  Each item endorsed is scored as one point. Data 
from participants scoring at least five points on these items were not used in this study due to a 
possible invalid response style. 
 Emotional Experiences Questionnaire (Roisman, Fortuna, & Holland, 2006). This 
questionnaire asks participants to rate the strength of 25 positive and negative emotions they may 
be experiencing.  The emotions being rated include a range of emotions, such as anxiety, 
amusement, happiness, and shame, in order to prevent participants from unmasking the 
researchers’ intention to manipulate ratings of state anxiety. Participants rated their emotions on 
a 9-point Likert scale from 0 (Not at all) to 8 (The most in my life).  This questionnaire was 
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given before and after the anxious mood and mood stabilizing inductions to allow the researchers 
to be able to determine if the inductions were effective.  This questionnaire was also given before 
the source identification task as a way to check that participants were no longer in a high state on 
anxiety while completing the source identification task.   
     It was expected that participants who received the anxious mood induction would increase 
their anxiety rating after the anxious mood induction. For the participants who received the mood 
stabilizing induction, it was expected that their pre-post anxiety ratings would not change 
significantly. 
Mood inductions. The participants experienced either an anxious mood induction or a 
mood stabilizing induction.  The current study induced state anxiety following the procedures 
used by Sinclair, Soldat, and Ryan (1997).  This induction procedure was used because it led to 
observable changes in the participants’ anxiety levels in multiple studies and because other 
anxious mood inductions confound increasing anxiety with the to-be-remembered information. 
Anxious mood induction (Sinclair, Soldat, & Ryan, 1997, Study 2). The participants 
were given a booklet composed of 59 sheets of paper with one statement typed on a sheet.  The 
59 statements included were designed to induce anxiety.   The participants also received a CD 
with the 59 statements read to them at the rate of one per 15 seconds.  They were to follow along 
in the booklet as they heard the statements read to them on the CD.  The CD told participants that 
“These statements are designed to make you feel anxious” (Sinclair et al., 1997, p. 168).  The 
statements started off neutral (“Today is neither better nor worse than any other day.” Sinclair et 
al., 1997; p. 171) and became increasingly more anxiety related (“I feel paralyzed with fear—
some very important decisions are almost impossible to make.” Sinclair et al., 1997; p. 173). One 
of the 60 statements in the induction was removed because it appeared very early in the sequence 
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and was not a neutral item. When the participants reached the end of the booklet, they were told 
on the CD, “Now that you’re feeling very anxious, concentrate on this feeling.  Feel it getting 
stronger and stronger, more and more worried.  Let it continue to build…Do and think whatever 
you can to build this very anxious mood.  Feel very, very anxious. Close your eyes.  Begin now” 
(Sinclair et al., 1997, p. 168, 173).  After two minutes of focusing on increasing the feeling of 
anxiety, participants again completed the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire.  This induction 
procedure was used because it led to observable changes in the participants’ anxiety levels in 
multiple studies (Sinclair et al., 1997).  
Mood stabilizing induction.  The mood stabilizing induction was based upon the mood 
induction used in Josephson, Singer, and Salovey (1996) and as such featured a video segment of 
This Old House, which is a home-improvement show.  The segment was the same length as the 
anxious mood induction procedure.   
Presentation of the to-be-source monitored information. Participants received 
information from two sources—a video and a questionnaire.  Participants viewed a 5-minute 
portion of a crime video depicting a burglary and a car chase that was used by Chambers and 
Zaragoza (2001) and Mitchell, Johnson, and Mather (2003).  Later, participants were given a 36-
item questionnaire (Mitchell et al., 2003) that consists of 3 sections of 12 questions each to allow  
participants to review the 12 event components in the video a total of 3 times.  Chambers and 
Zaragoza (2001) showed that being exposed to misleading information multiple times enhances 
the number of source monitoring errors.  
Positive mood induction. All participants experienced a positive mood induction in 
order to ensure that participants in the high state anxiety conditions were no longer in a state of 
high anxiety while they were completing the source identification task.  The induction required 
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that the participants listen to classical music for approximately 30 minutes. This induction has 
previously been shown to effectively induce a positive mood (Roisman, Fortuna, & Holland, 
2006). 
Filler tasks.  Participants engaged in filler tasks for approximately 10 minutes (i.e., word 
search) after viewing the to-be-source monitored video.  The anxious mood induction has been 
shown to last approximately 35 minutes (Sinclair, Soldat, & Ryan, 1997).  Therefore, it was 
necessary to ensure that approximately 40 minutes had passed from the end of the anxious mood 
induction until the time of the Source Identification Questionnaire, in order to be certain that 
participants were no longer in a state of high anxiety when they completed the source 
identification task.  The positive mood induction described above took approximately 30 
minutes, thereby necessitating this second 10-minute filler task before the source identification 
task.   
Source identification task (Mitchell, Johnson, & Mather, 2003). Participants were 
given the Source Identification task, which is comprised of 32 statements that asked participants 
to decide if the items were seen in the video, appeared in the Source Identification Questionnaire, 
appeared in both the video and the Source Identification Questionnaire, or were not presented in 
either the video or the Source Identification Questionnaire.  Participants were asked to indicate a 
response for each item but also to indicate if they were completely unsure/guessed.  The 
statements were administered on a CD and were spaced 8 seconds apart.  
Procedure 
 See Appendix A for outline of procedure. Participants were recruited via West Virginia 




Experimental procedures  
Four experimenters (3 females, 1 male) ran participants in this study.  First, participants 
completed the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire to measure trait anxiety and 
completed a demographics questionnaire.  Participants were then given the infrequency validity 
items from the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire. Participants’ baseline mood was 
assessed using the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire. Immediately following completion of 
the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire, the demographic questionnaire was reviewed by 
the researchers.  Any participant who had previous treatment or was currently in treatment for 
anxiety was instantly placed in the mood stabilizing induction condition, regardless of the 
condition in which the remainder of the group was placed.  During that time, participants were 
asked to take a break and remain in the back of the room.  
Participants who were assigned to the high state anxiety groups were given an anxious 
mood induction via computer and participants who were assigned to the low state anxiety groups 
were given a mood stabilizing induction via computer. Participants completed a second mood 
assessment using the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire to be certain that the anxious and 
mood stabilizing inductions were effective.  Participants were presented with to-be-source 
monitored information via two methods: (1) viewing a forensically relevant video and (2) 
responding to a questionnaire. Next, all participants were given a positive mood induction and 
filler tasks totaling 40 minutes. They then completed the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire 
for a final time to ensure that the effects of the anxious mood induction no longer impacted 
participants when they next participated in the source identification task.  Finally, participants 
completed an eyewitness source identification task that required them to accurately report the 
source of previously provided forensically relevant information that was viewed in the video or 
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that was presented in the Source Identification Questionnaire.  Participants were then verbally 
debriefed and asked to not share details of this study with other undergraduate students.  All 
participants received extra credit, if permitted by their course, for participation in this study. To 
encourage participation during a period of low registration numbers for summer classes, payment 
of $25 was offered to nine participants in addition to the extra credit. 
Results 
Mood Manipulation Checks 
Anxious mood induction condition. See Table 1. If the anxious mood induction was 
effective, a significant increase from Time 1 (baseline) to Time 2 (post anxious mood induction) 
would be expected. Therefore, a paired samples t-test using baseline and post-anxious mood 
induction ratings on the anxiety item on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire was 
conducted.  There was a statistically significant increase in anxiety ratings from Time 1 to Time 
2, t (35) = -10.33, p < .0005 (two-tailed).  Therefore, the anxious mood induction was effective. 
To determine whether anxiety decreased as a result of the positive mood induction and filler 
tasks, a paired-samples t-test was conducted on Time 2 to Time 3 (before the source 
identification task) anxiety Likert scale ratings on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire. 
There was a statistically significant decrease in anxiety ratings from Time 2 to Time 3, t (35) = 
10.11, p < .0005 (two-tailed).  The mean decrease in anxiety ratings was 2.97 with a 95% 
confidence interval ranging from 2.38 to 3.57.  To determine how anxiety levels changed from 
Time 1 to Time 3, another paired-samples t-test was performed.  Anxiety levels at Time 1 
significantly differed from those at Time 3, t (35) = 2.16, p = .04.  Anxiety decreased 
significantly as a result of the positive mood induction and filler tasks, so participants were no 
longer in a high state of anxiety when completing the source identification task.  More 
specifically, participants were least anxious at the time of the source identification task. 
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A paired-samples t-test was performed on Time 1 to Time 2 anxiety Likert scale ratings 
on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire to ensure that participants’ anxiety levels in the 
mood stabilizing induction condition did not increase following the induction.  The anxiety 
ratings at Time 1 were statistically different from the anxiety ratings at Time 2, t (35) = 3.71, p = 
.001 (two-tailed).  The mean decrease in anxiety ratings was 1.03 with a 95% confidence interval 
ranging from .46 to 1.59.  Participants were less anxious following the mood stabilizing 
induction. 
Finally, a paired-samples t-test was also performed for anxiety levels from Time 2 to 
Time 3.  The anxiety ratings at Time 2 were not statistically different from the anxiety ratings at 
Time 3, t (35) = -.44, p = .66 (two-tailed).  The mean increase in anxiety ratings was .11 with a 
95% confidence interval ranging from -.62 to .40.  Participants’ anxiety levels did not 
statistically change as a result of the mood stabilizing induction. 
Mood stabilizing condition. If the mood stabilization induction was effective, a 
significant increase in anxiety from Time 1 (baseline) to Time 2 (post anxious mood induction) 
would not be expected. A paired-samples t-test was performed on Time 1 to Time 2 anxiety 
Likert scale ratings on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire to ensure that participants’ 
anxiety levels in the mood stabilizing induction condition did not increase following the 
induction.  The anxiety ratings at Time 1 were statistically different from the anxiety ratings at 
Time 2, t (35) = 3.71, p = .001 (two-tailed).  The mean decrease in anxiety ratings was 1.03 with 
a 95% confidence interval ranging from .46 to 1.59.  Participants were less anxious following the 
mood stabilizing induction. 
Finally, a paired-samples t-test was also performed for anxiety levels from Time 2 to 
Time 3.  The anxiety ratings at Time 2 were not statistically different from the anxiety ratings at 
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Time 3, t (35) = -.44, p = .66 (two-tailed).  The mean increase in anxiety ratings was .11 with a 
95% confidence interval ranging from -.62 to .40.  Participants’ anxiety levels did not 
statistically change as a result of the mood stabilizing induction. 
Of interest, baseline anxiety ratings on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire 
significantly correlated with anxiety scores on the General Distress: Anxious Arousal scale on 
the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire, r = .24, p = .04. 
State-Trait Anxiety Analyses  
See Table 2. To determine the effects of state and trait anxiety on performance on source 
identification, a 2 (High vs. Low Trait Anxiety) X 2 (High vs. Low State Anxiety) ANOVA was 
conducted with the number of correct source monitoring responses as the dependent variable. 
There was a statistically significant main effect for state anxiety, F (1, 68) = 6.02, p = 
.02; the effect size was moderate (partial eta squared = .08).  High state anxiety increases 
accuracy on an eyewitness memory task.  Participants who were in a high state of anxiety were 
more accurate on the source monitoring task than were those who were in a low state of anxiety. 
The main effect for trait anxiety, F (1, 68) = .37, p = .55, did not reach statistical significance.  In 
this study, clinically significant levels of anxiety did not influence eyewitness memory. The 
interaction effect between state and trait anxiety was not statistically significant, F (1, 68) = .38, 





Effects were also examined after removing participants’ guesses on the source 
identification task.1 
See Table 3. To examine whether participants performed better on any particular type of 
question on the source identification task (questions about the video, the questionnaire, the video 
plus questionnaire, or new information), a two-way between-groups multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) was performed.  Four dependent variables were used: to-be-remembered 
material from the video only, from both the video and the questionnaire, from neither the video 
nor the questionnaire (i.e., new information), and information from the questionnaire only.  The 
independent variables were state and trait anxiety levels (high vs. low).  There was not a 
statistically significant state- trait anxiety interaction effect, F (4, 65) = .91, p = .46; Wilks’ 
Lambda = .95; partial eta squared = .05 nor was there a statistically significant difference 
between high and low trait anxiety, F (4, 65) = .57, p = .69; Wilks’ Lambda = .97; partial eta 
squared = .03, on the combined dependent variables.  However, there was a statistically 
significant difference between high and low state anxiety on the combined dependent variables, 
F (4, 65) = 2.89, p = .03; Wilks’ Lambda = .85; partial eta squared = .15.   
                                                          
1A 2 (High vs. Low Trait Anxiety) X 2 (High vs. Low State Anxiety) ANOVA was conducted with the 
number of correct source monitoring responses that were not guesses as the dependent variable.  The interaction 
effect between state and trait anxiety was not statistically significant, F (1, 68) = .00, p = .97.  The main effect for 
state anxiety, F (1, 68) = 3.54, p = .06, became nonsignificant.  The main effect for trait anxiety, F (1, 68) = .02, p = 
.90, remained nonsignificant.  This analysis was conducted because it was expected that source monitoring was not 
being measured if an individual did not have a memory for the event, or in other words, they guessed.  However, 
these results suggest that participants were not accurate in determining if they were guessing.  Therefore, these 






When the results for the 4 dependent variables were considered separately, the only mean 
difference that reached statistical significance was the to-be-remembered material from the video 
only, F (1, 68) = 10.01, p = .002, partial eta squared = .13.  Participants in a high state of anxiety 
more accurately remembered information that was only presented in the video than participants 
in a low state of anxiety. Surprisingly, there was no significant effect of anxiety on misleading 
information presented in the questionnaire which is inconsistent with the previous literature on 
anxiety and suggestibility.  
Discussion 
The current study examined the novel question of whether highly anxious people perform 
differently on an eyewitness memory task when they are in a high state of anxiety. In order to 
examine this question, this study employed a 2 (high vs. low state) X 2 (high vs. low trait) design 
using a source monitoring task as the outcome variable. In the current design, participants were 
anxious at encoding of the to-be-remembered event, but were not anxious during the eyewitness 
recall task. With a single exception, previous studies on anxiety and eyewitness memory have 
limited their designs to include manipulations of state anxiety only or measurement of existing 
trait anxiety. The one study that included measurement of state and trait anxiety, measured trait 
anxiety before the to-be-remembered event and state anxiety after the to-be-remembered event, 
and therefore addressed a different research question.  
There was a main effect of state anxiety in the current study such that people who were in 
a high state of anxiety as a result of an anxious mood induction that was administered prior to 
viewing the to-be-remembered video made fewer errors on the source monitoring task. Yerkes-
Dodson’s law (1908) theorizes that moderate levels of anxiety are ideal for cognitive 
performance. Levels of anxiety that are too low or too high impair performance. In the current 
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study, anxiety was measured immediately following the anxious mood induction and levels were 
moderate. This moderate level of anxiety represented a statistically significant increase from a 
baseline rating that was taken immediately prior to the mood induction. This suggests that the 
anxious mood induction was effective. It is important to point out that participants were no 
longer anxious when they completed the source monitoring task as measured by another set of 
anxiety ratings given immediately prior to the source monitoring task. The anxious mood 
induction employed in the current study lasted for approximately 35 minutes (Sinclair et al., 
1997). The source monitoring eyewitness task was completed approximately 40 minutes after the 
end of the anxious mood induction. Filler tasks and a positive mood induction were provided in 
the interim time period.  
The current study failed to find that trait anxiety impacts eyewitness performance as there 
was no main effect of trait anxiety. That is, high levels of general anxiety similar to those of 
people with clinically significant anxiety did not influence eyewitness memory. Due to 
attentional biases associated with anxiety, it might be expected that an individual high in anxiety 
might perform better on an eyewitness task (e.g., Coles et al., 2007).  Findings of other research 
suggest that people high in anxiety might perform better on an eyewitness task. However, 
performance was equivalent. The interaction between state and trait anxiety was also 
nonsignificant, and therefore the current study failed to find differences in the performance of 
highly anxious individuals in a current state of high anxiety. The nonsignificant findings may be 
a result of lack of power given that we only had 5 participants in this group. This group was hard 
to fill because for ethical reasons we nonrandomly assigned people who were high in anxiety 
who were currently in treatment for an anxiety disorder to the mood stabilizing condition. A 
second possible explanation is that the to-be-remembered video depicting the crime was not 
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anxiety-provoking.  Although the video depicted a robbery and high-speed chase, the video is 
nonviolent.  Witnessing a crime generally increased an individual’s anxiety level; however, it is 
likely that the video did not exert the same influence on the subjects in this study that would be 
expected if they witnessed a crime outside of the experimental setting.  Therefore, one might 
assume that the five participants with clinically significant levels of anxiety who were in a high 
state of anxiety would experience a higher level of anxiety in response to the video. However, 
these 5 participants had a lower average anxiety score on the Emotional Experiences 
Questionnaire after video viewing (M = 3.20, SD = 2.28) than did the 31 participants who had 
clinically significant anxiety levels, but who were in a high state of anxiety (M = 3.74, SD = 
1.80). 
 A review of the literature finds that anxious individuals are not more likely than non-
anxious individuals to get accurate information correct on source monitoring tasks, but that they 
are more likely to get more misleading responses correct.  In the current study, participants were 
asked to either indicate whether information came from 4 categories: video only, questionnaire 
only, video plus questionnaire, or was new and therefore never presented.  The information 
presented in the questionnaire is conceptualized as misleading information.  Therefore, to 
examine whether the basic finding of greater eyewitness accuracy in the face of misleading 
information replicated in this study, we analyzed responses to the “questionnaire” questions.  We 
did not find a significant main effect of state anxiety, trait anxiety, or a significant interaction.  It 
is possible that presenting misinformation in a questionnaire instead of in an in-person interview 
did not lend itself to being impacted by anxiety. 
 Further analyses of responses from the video only, from the questionnaire only, or from 
both the video and the questionnaire were competed.  Participants who received the anxious 
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mood induction were more accurate in response to identifying source monitoring information 
presented in the video only than participants who received a neutral mood induction.  This 
suggests that anxious participants better encoded the video than did the non-anxious participants.  
There were no significant effects of trait anxiety or significant interaction.  This explanation is 
consistent with the Dobson and Markham (1992) findings that high state anxiety at encoding 
improves memory performance. Regarding the video plus the questionnaire and the new 
information, there were no significant main effects or interactions, but the pattern of means was 
in the expected direction with high state anxiety participants having means indicating slightly 
higher accuracy. 
 In general, the results of this study do not converge with previous findings in the memory 
literature which suggests that anxiety impairs memory performance (e.g., Kaye et al, 1953).  
Rather, these results converge more closely with previous findings in the suggestibility literature 
and in the memory literature in which potentially threatening information is presented showing 
that high anxiety is linked to reduced suggestibility or greater accuracy.  In this study, high state 
anxiety was associated with fewer source monitoring errors.  Although the findings of the current 
study directly replicate the findings of Ridley and Clifford (2006), who also found effects of high 
state anxiety but no effect of high trait anxiety and no significant interaction, the method does 
not allow for direct comparisons to be drawn.  State anxiety was measured after the to-be-
remembered video.   
 A major strength of the current study is the fact that the anxious mood induction was not 
confounded with to-be-remembered material or the memory interview itself.  Instead, state 
anxiety was manipulated prior to presentation of the to-be-remembered material and checks were 
used to determine the effectiveness of the anxious mood induction to ensure that participants 
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were more anxious at the time of encoding rather than during any other time throughout the 
experiment. Additionally, the current study utilized the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire, which is a measure of pure anxiety that is able to differentiate between depression 
and anxiety, unlike the commonly used State-Trait Anxiety Inventory which measures distress 
rather than anxiety. 
 A limitation to the study is the lack of practice items that would have allowed the 
researchers to screen for lack of understanding of the source monitoring task.  Some participants 
performed at or below chance level on the source monitoring tasks and without those screening 
items, it is impossible to determine whether participants completely understood the task 
directions.  
 In sum, in this study, clinically significant levels of anxiety did not influence eyewitness 
memory. However, being anxious during encoding is associated with more accurate recall on a 
source monitoring task.  In addition, clinically significant levels of anxiety do not interact with 
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Mean anxiety ratings on the Emotional Experiences Questionnaire across conditions and time  
Mood Induction Condition T1 T2 T3 
     Anxious 1.03 (1.03)a 3.67 (1.85)b .69 (1.04)c 
     Mood Stabilizing 2.25 (2.18) 1.22 (1.87) 1.33 (2.16) 






















Descriptive statistics for main and interaction effects on total correct source monitoring 
 Mean SE 95% CI  





  Main effects    
Low Trait Anxiety 16.99 .61 15.77 18.20  
High Trait Anxiety 17.79 1.16 15.46 20.11  
Low State Anxiety 15.78 .77 14.25 17.31  
High State Anxiety 19.00 1.07 16.87 21.12  
  Interaction effects    
Low Trait, Low State Anxiety 15.78 .92 13.94 17.62  
Low Trait, High State Anxiety 18.19 .79 16.61 19.78  
High Trait, Low State Anxiety 14.77 1.23 13.32 18.22  
High Trait, High State Anxiety 19.80 1.98 15.85 23.75  








Descriptive statistics for source monitoring question type 
 Mean SE 95% CI 




  Main effects   
Low Trait Anxiety     
     Video Only 6.04 .25 5.54 6.54 
     Both Video and Questionnaire 4.95 .24 4.47 5.43 
     New Information 3.35 .14 3.08 3.62 
     Misleading Information 2.65 .28 2.09 3.21 
High Trait Anxiety     
     Video Only 6.38 .48 5.43 7.33 
     Both Video and Questionnaire 4.71 .46 3.78 5.63 
     New Information 3.42 .26 2.90 3.94 
     Misleading Information 3.29 .54 2.22 4.35 
Low State Anxiety     
     Video Only 5.36 .31 4.73 5.99 
42 
 
     Both Video and Questionnaire 4.68 .31 4.07 5.29 
     New Information 3.16 .17 2.82 3.50 
     Misleading Information 2.58 .35 1.88 3.28 
High State Anxiety     
     Video Only 7.06 .44 6.19 7.93 
     Both Video and Questionnaire 4.98 .42 4.14 5.83 
     New Information 3.61 .24 3.13 4.08 
     Misleading Information 3.35 .49 2.37 4.33 
  Interaction effects   
Low Trait, Low State Anxiety     
     Video Only 5.57 .38 4.81 6.32 
     Both Video and Questionnaire 4.74 .37 4.01 5.47 
     New Information 3.09 .21 2.68 3.50 
     Misleading Information 2.39 .42 1.55 3.24 
 
 
    
43 
 
Low Trait, High State Anxiety 
     Video Only 6.52 .33 5.87 7.16 
     Both Video and Questionnaire 5.16 .32 4.53 5.79 
     New Information 3.61 .18 3.26 3.97 
     Misleading Information 2.90 .37 2.17 3.63 
High Trait, Low State Anxiety     
     Video Only 5.15 .50 4.15 6.15 
     Both Video and Questionnaire 4.62 .49 3.64 5.59 
     New Information 3.23 .28 2.68 3.78 
     Misleading Information 2.77 .56 1.64 3.90 
High Trait, High State Anxiety     
     Video Only 7.60 .81 5.99 9.21 
     Both Video and Questionnaire 4.80 .79 3.23 6.37 
     New Information 3.60 .44 2.72 4.48 
     Misleading Information 3.80 .91 1.99 5.62 






1. Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire 
2. Demographic Questionnaire 
3. Infrequency Validity Items from the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire 
4. Emotional Experiences Questionnaire 
5. Anxious Mood Induction or Mood Stabilizing Induction 
6. Emotional Experiences Questionnaire 
7. To-be-source monitored information 
8. Filler Task 
9. Positive Mood Induction 
10. Emotional Experiences Questionnaire 
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